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INTRODUCTION

In May 2009, the American Law Institute (ALI) approved its
Principles of the Law of Software Contracts (Principles). The attempt
to codify, or at least unify, the law of software contracts has a long and
contentious history, the roots of which can be found in the attempt to
add an Article 2B to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the
mid-1990s. Article 2B became the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) when the ALI withdrew from the project in
1999, and UCITA became the law in only two states, Virginia and
Maryland. UCITA became a dirty word, with several states enacting
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“bomb shelter” provisions to ensure that UCITA would never enter
those states by way of a choice of law clause.1 Although the
Principles was conceived, in part, as a counterweight to UCITA, the
latter was dead in the water by the time the Principles Project became
active. Nevertheless, the Principles Project proceeded apace. This
Article examines the results of that decision.
The proponents of efforts to formulate a body of law for software
contracts tend to insist that such a body of law is necessary because
software transfers, as transfers of copies of information, are different
from transfers of goods, and these differences make the common law
of contracts and Article 2 of the UCC inappropriate bodies of law to
govern software contracts.2 The ALI Principles constitutes the latest
attempt at such unification, and in this Article, we argue that there is
little in the Principles that addresses any unique characteristics of
software. Neither one of us was involved in the Article 2B/UCITA
project, so we approach this problem by looking at the law as it existed
at the time the Principles Project started instead of looking at the law
at the time Article 2B was conceived.
II.

WHERE’S THE PROBLEM?

In an early draft, the Principles justified itself as necessary to
correct “disarray” in the law involving software contracts.3 This
language was toned down in the final version of the Principles, where
the law of software transactions was said to be “continu[ing] to
develop” and where ultimately the Principles was justified in the end
on the ground that software is an economically important area that
Unfortunately, the
needs to be “clarif[ied] and unif[ied].”4
commentary to the Principles never explained why existing law did
not perform that function adequately. Nevertheless, the ALI went
ahead with a project that lasted four years and occupied the efforts of

1.
For a short history by the Associate Reporter for the Principles project, see
Maureen A. O’Rourke, An Essay on the Challenges of Drafting a Uniform Law of Software
Contracting, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 925, 927-30 (2006); see also Deborah Tussey,
UCITA, Copyright, and Capture, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 319, 319 (2003) (“‘[B]omb
shelter’ provisions . . . outnumber adoptions of the act itself.”).
2.
See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What Courts and
UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 255,
257-58 (2000).
3.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, DISCUSSION DRAFT 1 (ALI
2007) [hereinafter DISCUSSION DRAFT].
4.
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS (2010)
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
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any number of talented persons, especially, of course, the efforts of the
extremely able Reporters.
The original UCC Article 2B project began because of the view
that Article 2 of the UCC itself could not apply to software. Whether
Article 2 should apply to software is still debated by scholars,5 but
courts tend to apply Article 2 uniformly to software transactions.6
Certainly, Article 2 is not a perfect fit, because it clearly does not cover
some software-specific issues, such as the distinction between licenses
and sales and the relationship between software contracts and federal
intellectual property law, but the project glossed over those problems
and set to tweaking Article 2 for inexplicable reasons.
III. BUT THERE WERE PROBLEMS
The Principles Project gave the ALI the perfect opportunity to
identify the best approach to two software-specific issues: (1) whether
an agreement labeled a license grants only license rights despite
characteristics making it functionally equivalent to a sales agreement,
and (2) the limits placed by copyright law on freedom of contract.
These two issues have either not been covered at all in the Principles
(in the former case), or have been covered in a cursory fashion (in the
latter case).
A.

License or Sale?

Software vendors almost always attempt to license not only their
intellectual property but also the material embodiment of that
intellectual property, such as the disk containing the software. There
are many reasons for doing this: one is to avoid the impact of
copyright law’s first-sale doctrine7 and another is to avoid the
application of Article 2 of the UCC.8 The characterization of a
transaction as a license rather than a sale has other ramifications as
5.
See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Contracting Out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label:
A Strategy that Should Not Work for Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 262 (2006)
(suggesting that Article 2 is appropriate for software transactions in the areas of contract
formation, quality warranties, and damage remedies); Raymond T. Nimmer, An Essay on
Article 2’s Irrelevance to Licensing Agreements, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 235, 237 (2006)
(arguing that the rules of Article 2 “are, and should be, irrelevant to licensing”).
6.
See, e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991);
Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Tex.
2006); I. Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002);
Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747 (Kan. 2006).
7.
See, e.g., John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are
Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2004).
8.
Braucher, supra note 5, at 275.
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well, particularly in bankruptcy.9 While there are cases that set forth
guidelines for distinguishing a license from a sale, the guidelines are
by no means clear. Although courts say that they focus on the
economic realities of each transaction to distinguish a license from a
sale, the economic realities differ depending on the type of case. For
instance, courts in bankruptcy cases will look at whether the entire
obligation to pay was incurred prepetition.10 This is important in
bankruptcy because if the transferee’s entire payment obligation was
incurred prepetition, the transaction looks like a sale on credit and the
transferor is treated as a vendor who, if unsecured, would be paid only
a portion of its payment claim.11 If the transferor is successful in
having its transaction classified as an executory license, the transferee,
in order to retain its right to the software in bankruptcy, would be
required to make all payments anticipated by the contract.12
On the other hand, sometimes the question of whether a license is
really a sale arises when the transferee transfers the software in
contravention of the license agreement. In those cases, the transferee
wants the license characterized as a sale so that its subsequent transfer
is protected by the first-sale doctrine. In cases in which first sale is the
issue, courts have held that a contract requiring a single payment for a
perpetual transfer of possession is a contract for sale, thus triggering
the first-sale doctrine.13
At first blush, the bankruptcy cases appear very different from the
first-sale cases, with the bankruptcy cases focusing on the amount of
the transferor’s payment in bankruptcy and the first-sale cases
implicating the relationship between freedom of contract and federal
intellectual property law. At a very basic level, however, the question
in the two types of cases is the same: did the transferee acquire the
property rights of an owner? If the answer is yes, the debtor/transferee
9.
A license is treated as an executory contract under the Bankruptcy Code. 11
U.S.C. § 365 (2006); see In re DAK Indus., 66 F.3d 1091, 1093-95 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
that a software transaction was a sale rather than a license where the debtor and Microsoft
entered into a software distribution agreement under which the debtor promised to pay for the
software in five installments because the debtor had acquired all rights to the software that it
was to distribute before filing its bankruptcy petition).
10. See In re DAK Indus., 66 F.3d at 1091.
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (2006) (stating that unsecured creditors are paid only
after priority claims are paid in full); WARREN E. AGIN, BANKRUPTCY AND SECURED LENDING
IN CYBERSPACE § 7, at 20 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that a vendor under a nonexecutory
agreement of sale is a general unsecured creditor).
12. The Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee in bankruptcy to assume or reject any
executory contract of the debtor. To assume an executory license, the trustee (or debtor in
possession) must cure all defaults under the license and provide adequate assurance of future
payment. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b).
13. Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).

2010]

ALI PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACTING

5

in bankruptcy keeps the software and the vendor is paid as an ordinary
creditor. Likewise, the transferee who wishes to resell the software
may do so because of the first-sale doctrine.
In the 1980s, when the ALI and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated Article 2A of the
UCC to govern leases of goods, the drafters developed a test for
distinguishing licenses from sales. This test focuses on the economic
realities of the transaction in question.14 In developing this test, the
drafters drew from a large body of case law in which courts had
reclassified leases as secured sales if the lease agreements appeared to
grant the transferee ownership of the “leased” goods for the entire
economic life of those goods.15 The drafters also identified, and
rejected, factors that had led a few courts to rule that a lease was in fact
a sale, and added a subsection instructing courts that some factors,
standing alone, did not transform a lease into a secured sale.16
The lack of standard guidelines in the software case law might
make a similar test for distinguishing a license from a sale an
inappropriate component of a Restatement project, as a Restatement
sets forth settled law, or law that “might plausibly be stated by a
court.”17 A Principles project, on the other hand, aims to “express[] the
law as it should be.”18 Incorporating such a test into the Principles
would have addressed an important software-specific problem.
Unfortunately, that was not done.
B.

Contract or IP Law?

The relationship between contract law and federal intellectual
property law is of great importance in software transactions. The
Associate Reporter for the Principles, Maureen O’Rourke, identified
this relationship as a major software problem, because software
contracts, “perhaps more than other contracts, routinely contain
provisions that seek to broaden intellectual property rights.”19
Nevertheless, the Principles simply states that a contract term “is
unenforceable if it (a) conflicts with a mandatory rule of federal
intellectual property law; or (b) conflicts impermissibly with the
14. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2001).
15. See generally Corinne Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease Under the
UCC, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 195 (1988).
16. U.C.C. § 1-203(c) & cmt. 2.
17. This description of the Restatements is from the ALI Web site. See ALI,
Overview, http://ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.main (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
18. Id.
19. O’Rourke, supra note 1, at 933.
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purposes and policies of federal intellectual property law; or (c) would
constitute federal intellectual property misuse in an infringement
proceeding.”20
Dean O’Rourke explained in her article that the preemption
section “focused on stating the law at a high level and providing
expansive comments to provide courts with factors to evaluate in
deciding whether or not to enforce a particular contractual
provision.”21 Certainly the comments are expansive and provide
factors that a court should consider in determining whether a
contractual provision conflicts with federal intellectual property law.
For instance, one factor that the comments suggest that courts consider
is the parties’ relative bargaining power, because restrictions in
standard-form agreements look more like restrictions binding on the
entire world (and thus preempted by copyright law) than those in
negotiated agree-ments.22 A Principles project can set forth best
practices; indeed, the Principles does so in the contract formation
section. It is curious, then, why these “best factors,” pulled from
cases, did not make it into the “black letter,” especially given the ALI’s
position that Principles projects have the goal of stating the law as it
should be.23 It would have been better if the influence of the ALI on
drafters and courts had been squarely placed behind black letter
provisions, rather than relegating the good stuff to the comments.
Unfortunately, the Reporters seemed hindered in their approach
to preemption by the UCITA drafting history. The preemption issue
was a particularly contentious one in the drafting process,24 and the
ultimate resolution in UCITA was not a resolution at all: UCITA states
that a provision of UCITA is unenforceable to the extent that it is
preempted by federal law,25 and that a court may refuse to enforce a

20. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 1.09.
21. O’Rourke, supra note 1, at 934.
22. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a “simple two-party contract is not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright and therefore may be enforced” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). But see Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Dyk, J., dissenting) (suggesting a state law giving effect to nonnegotiated contracts
eliminating fair use is no different from a hypothetical state law eliminating fair use in
contravention of federal law).
23. ALI, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR
ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 12 (2005), available at
http://www.ali.
org/doc/StyleManual.pdf (stating that the Principles “assume the stance of expressing the law
as it should be, which may or may not reflect the law as it is”).
24. O’Rourke, supra note 1, at 933.
25. UCITA § 105(a) (2002).
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contract term if that term conflicts with a fundamental public policy.26
The Principles was drafted ten years after UCITA. In the intervening
decade, standard-form software licenses had become more common,
and courts had had more opportunities to address the preemption issue.
In addition, UCITA, as a uniform law, could not veer very far from
rules established in case law because it had to be sold to state
legislatures for enactment.27 The Principles, on the other hand, is
aspirational and could have squarely addressed the issue. The failure
to do so was a major omission of the project.
IV. BUT THEY FOUND GENERIC PROBLEMS TO ADDRESS
The failure of the Principles to deal with serious softwarespecific problems stands in sharp contrast to its willingness to deal
with nonsoftware issues.28 Thus, there are sections on public policy,
interpretation, unconscionability, choice of law, forum selection
clauses, parol evidence, “whose meaning prevails,” liquidated
damages, specific performance, and other problems that are well
understood in contract law today. Indeed, only about twenty-two
percent of the pages in the Principles deals with software-specific
problems.29 It is not clear why the Reporters addressed these issues
rather than other issues that may arise in contracts—for example,
mistake, impossibility, incidental damages, and so on. No attempt was
made to explain the reasons why some were chosen.
Some of those sections are copied more or less verbatim from the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.30 Although the commentary to the
Principles does not explain why these provisions were needed in a
26. Id. § 105(b).
27. One criticism of the uniform laws drafting process is that it is not focused on
producing the “best” law because of concerns about enactability. Tussey, supra note 1, at
355.
28. A very common phrase in the Reporters’ Notes is “courts have applied
unconscionability [or other common contract law rules] in software cases.” The Notes do not
explain why that commonplace occurrence is worth noting, although the frequency of that
notation underscores the notion that the Principles contains little that is original.
29. About 61 of the 276 pages deal with software-specific problems. Sections 1.01
through 1.09 and section 4.03 are the only sections that deal with software-specific issues,
and most of those provisions are definitional. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4. Two other
sections, sections 3.01 (dealing with indemnification against infringement) and 4.04 (dealing
with cancellation), deal with issues that are probably more prevalent in software contracts
than in contracts for the transfer of goods. Id.
30. An example of a copied section with very minor, but unexplained, changes to the
text of the Restatement is the definition of unconscionability, found in section 1.11;
unfortunately, the comments to the Principles do not explain why the definition of
unconscionability found in section 208 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts needed to
be changed. See id.
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project devoted to software contracts, a niche of general contract law,
they are probably harmless.31 Other parts of the Principles, however,
do deviate from accepted law. Again, there is no explanation as to
why the problems addressed by these provisions are limited to
software. Instead, the proffered solutions seem to take advantage of
the open ended nature of the project to set forth best principles for
most anything, or at least some things that might involve software—as
well as every other commercial transaction.
One example of inexplicable change can be found in the
Principles’ approach to the “battle of the forms” problem. In
section 2.01, the Principles adopts the battle of the forms provision
from amended Article 2, which is not only not the law in any state, but
which has not even been introduced for adoption in any state.32 In the
comments, the Reporters justify this choice by stating that the
amended Article 2 provision “is clearer and simpler than original § 2207 and is party neutral.”33 That may very well be the case, but the
choice has nothing to do with the nature of software transactions.
Other examples of changes that have little to do with software
involve choice of law and choice of forum. The section on choice of
law inexplicably deals only with standard-form contracts, with special
provisions for consumer transactions.34 Why is that? Do only those
types of software contracts have choice-of-law issues?35 Similarly, the
choice-of-forum provision (section 1.14) is drawn from section 80 of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws but is by no means
identical. Why the changes? And do they have anything to do with
software? Again, these questions are not addressed.
V.

THERE ARE SOME USEFUL PROVISIONS

Despite the lack of software-specific provisions, the Principles
may provide some useful guidance in solving problems that, while not
software-specific, are seen often in software transactions.
31. An irritating aspect of the Principles is the frequency by which it says that
“courts have enforced [insert legal rule] in software agreements.” E.g., ALI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 4, § 1.13 cmt. a (referring to choice of law provisions). These “dog bites man”
references have the appearance of mere filler.
32. See Uniform Law Comm’rs, A Few Facts About the Amendments to UCC
Articles 2 and 2A, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fsucc22A03.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
33. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.01(b)(2) & cmt. d.
34. Id. § 1.13.
35. For some reason, the Reporters’ Notes to section 1.13, and not the black letter,
refer nonstandard form contracts to section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts. Id.
§ 1.13 cmt. a. The Notes do not disclose the model for section 1.13 (b), although the source
for section 1.13(a) is (confusingly) described. See id.
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Formation

The electronic contract formation and modification sections are
examples of such provisions. The major formation problem courts
have faced in electronic contracting cases might be styled the “wrap”
problem—whether contracts have been formed by means of
“shrinkwrap,” “browsewrap,” or “clickwrap.”36 Section 2.02 (b) of the
Principles, after some initial hesitation,37 adopts a general standard of
reasonableness to determine formation issues. This is also the
standard that courts have settled on in “wrap” cases,38 and, of course, it
is the general standard in contract law: that of the reasonable person.39
For many years, courts have enforced paper standard terms as
contracts if those terms satisfy a “reasonable communicativeness” test.
Under that test, a court evaluates the physical characteristics of the
form to determine whether it sends a signal that it is intended to be a
binding legal document and also considers other subjective factors to
determine whether the offeree had the opportunity to become
meaningfully informed of the terms of the form.40
This reasonable communicativeness test provides useful
guidance to courts in deciding electronic contract formation cases.
Courts in the early cases often held, with little discussion, that an
offeree could be contractually bound to electronic terms simply by
clicking an “I agree” icon on the Web site.41 Courts combined a
number of different presentations into this “clickwrap” category:
terms with an “I agree” icon at the end, terms in a pop-up box with an
“I agree” icon adjacent to the box, and terms that were accessible
36. For an explanation of these terms, see Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap
Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279,
279-80 (2003).
37. An early draft of the Principles provided that electronically presented standardform terms would be enforceable only if the offeree was required to click her agreement at
the end of the form. See DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 3, § 2.01.
38. E.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402-03 (2d Cir. 2004);
Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96230, at *15-17 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); see also Juliet M. Moringiello & William L.
Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Electronic Contracting Cases 2007-2008, 64
BUS. LAW. 199, 203-05 (2008) (discussing judicial approach to browsewrap).
39. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1307, 1337-40 (2005) (discussing opinions applying the reasonable communicativeness test).
40. See id. (noting that courts have long required that standard-form paper contracts
reasonably communicate their terms in order to be enforced as contracts).
41. See generally DeJohn v. TV Corp. Int’l, 245 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003)
(upholding terms that were presented via hyperlink above the “I agree” icon); I. Lan Sys.,
Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that
clickwrap is an acceptable way to form a contract without explaining the presentation of the
contract terms).
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through a hyperlink adjacent to the “I agree” icon.42 On the other
hand, the courts were less receptive to “browsewrap,” a term used to
describe a presentation that does not require any explicit manifestation
of assent.43 More recently, courts have recognized that the line
between clickwrap and browsewrap can be blurry, especially when the
terms can be reached only via a hyperlink on the same page as the “I
agree” icon.44 By endorsing a reasonableness test, the Principles steers
courts away from a sometimes false distinction between clickwrap and
browsewrap and encourages the use of well-developed, paper-world
contract formation principles.
B.

Safe Harbors

Some clickwrap presentations are better than others, and the
Principles recognizes this. The Principles provides a safe harbor for
formation under which a transferee will be deemed to have accepted
standard form terms if certain requirements are met.45 This safe
harbor, as applied to electronic standard form terms, recognizes that
standard form terms should be enforced if the offeree has reasonable
notice of and access to the terms before payment and signifies her
assent to the terms at the end of or adjacent to the standard form if it is
presented electronically. Therefore, if a software transferor presents
contract terms by way of a pop-up box and the “I agree” icon appears
next to that box, the terms will be enforced. This safe harbor provides
useful guidance to courts in analyzing all electronically presented
terms, not just those in software transactions. Indeed, many of the
cases cited in the Reporters’ Notes explaining the formation section
have nothing to do with software.46

42. See Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of
Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 990 (2008) (describing these different
types of presentations).
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Hotels.com, L.P. v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Tex. App. 2006)
(explaining that the terms at issue could not be “neatly characterized as either a ‘click-wrap’
or ‘browse-wrap’ agreement”).
45. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.02(c).
46. In the commentary to section 2.02, the drafters cite to Register.com v. Verio, Inc.,
126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004), which dealt with the
defendant’s unauthorized access to the WHOIS database; Motise v. America Online, Inc., 346
F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), which involved the terms of service for an America Online
account; and Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), appeal denied, 844
N.E.2d 965 (Ill. 2006), which dealt with the sale of a computer, as well as several other cases
that had nothing to do with software.
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Remote Disablement

One of the most contentious issues in the UCITA drafting process
was that of remote disablement of software as a remedy for breach of
the software agreement. Although the final version of UCITA does not
allow such disablement,47 much time was spent discussing the parade
of horribles that would occur, including planes falling from the sky, if
UCITA were to become law.48
Remote disablement is a form of self-help repossession, and selfhelp is a rare remedy in American law. It exists under Article 9 of the
UCC, but a creditor wishing to use that remedy must not breach the
peace.49 This rule is so strong in Article 9 that parties to a security
agreement cannot vary it by contract, nor can they attempt to define
breach of the peace in their contracts.50 The possibility of breaching
the peace and incurring penalties for doing so forces many secured
creditors to forgo their self-help remedy and use the judicial process of
replevin to foreclose on their collateral. Likewise, self-help is not
permitted in landlord-tenant law. An owner who wants to recover his
premises from a tenant who is violating a lease must resort to the
judicial process of eviction to do so.51
The law prohibits self-help in most instances in order to preserve
the peace. It is obvious that a tenant who is faced with a landlord
trying to enter leased premises might react in such a way that could
lead to violence. When software and other intangible assets are
involved, the law today gives little guidance as to whether self-help is
appropriate. Here, the Principles makes an important policy choice; it
does not allow self-help disablement as a remedy for breach of
contract under any circumstances.52
47. UCITA § 605(f) (2002) (“This section does not authorize use of an automatic
restraint to enforce remedies because of breach of contract or for cancellation for breach.”).
48. See Mary Jo Howard Dively, The New Laws that Will Enable Electronic
Contracting: A Survey of the Electronic Contracting Rules in the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 38 DUQ. L. REV.
209, 250 (2000) (referencing popular press accounts of the potential for electronic self-help
being used to shut down air traffic control and hospital systems).
49. U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2) (2001).
50. Id. §§ 9-602(6), 9-603(b).
51. See, e.g., Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Minn. 1978) (“We recognize that
the growing modern trend departs completely from the common-law rule to hold that selfhelp is never available to dispossess a tenant who is in possession and has not abandoned or
voluntarily surrendered the premises.”).
52. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 4.03. The Principles do, however, allow a
transferor to build a “time bomb” into software that disables the software after an agreed-to
period of time in the agreement provided that the software would only be available for that
period of time. Id.
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VI. THE GLORIES OF THE COMMON LAW
More generally, the failure of the Principles even to identify
significant software-specific legal problems shows the resilience of
existing law when faced with new technology. This should come as
no surprise. One of the glories of the common law is that it has proven
itself infinitely adaptable to changed circumstances—as Lord Coke
famously said, “Out of the olde fields grow the new corne.”53 We have
read every reported decision involving electronic contracts decided
since 2004.54 Those cases show that courts have no trouble in dealing
with the problems posed by new technology; they simply have applied
traditional law, primarily hornbook contract law, with little or no
hesitation.
The Principles Project combined the efforts of many enormously
talented and dedicated persons, especially the efforts of the Reporters.
That the project in the end has so little to offer in the way of softwarespecific provisions does provide a wonderful confirmation of the
ability of Lord Coke’s “olde corne” to grow in “new fields.” That is a
lesson that perhaps cannot be learned too often. The absence of
software-specific provisions in the Principles may confirm that case
law is getting it right.
In the end, the Principles shows the hazard of seeking a solution
to a problem that does not exist. By the time the Project began, it
should have become clear that although there were scattered
statements that the relevant law was in a state of “disarray”55 and
although software transaction are of enormous economic importance,
there were few serious legal issues for the project to address. We
know that because there has been little litigation over software-specific
issues. In fact, the cases in the Reporters’ notes generally do not
involve software, suggesting how few software-specific issues have
arisen. Moreover, UCITA no longer threatened anyone. There was, in
short, no problem to address, and the Principles became, in the end,
much ado about nothing.

53. SIR EDWARD COKE, PREFACE TO THE FIRST PART OF THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD
COKE KNT. (Joseph Butterworth & Son 1826) (1727).
54. We did so for Annual Surveys on Electronic Contracting, which we published in
The Business Lawyer. See, e.g., Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 38. The opinions we
read were “reported” in the sense that they were available on an electronic database.
55. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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VII. A PATCH?
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was published in
1971 in the middle of great ferment in the whole field. Fifteen years
later, the ALI published a “patch,” a small volume that updated three
dozen sections of the Second Restatement in light of the many
developments during that period. Perhaps a similar patch should have
been the goal of the Software Project. The Principles, after all,
contains very few software-related provisions, and they could have
been bundled together in a handy slim volume devoted only to
software problems.56
VIII. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE
There are lessons for the ALI to be drawn from the Software
Principles. First, be careful that new projects are chosen on their own
merits, rather than as an effort to settle old scores. Second, be sure that
the project addresses the issues that do need to be considered. Finally,
the charter for the project—that is, the scope and coverage—should be
clear, and the work should not stray from that charter.
A.

Avoid Original Sin

Nevertheless, the project was not abandoned—in part, no doubt,
because some of those who were unhappy with UCITA’s alleged
failure to protect consumers wanted to rewrite the law in the area of
electronic contracting, but the Principles seems to have continued
mostly because of inertia.57 The project teaches, therefore, that
constant evaluation should be conducted during the course of any
endeavor to see whether it really should be continued. In other words,
a project conceived in sin may not be worth doing.
B.

Deal with Trouble-Spots

More troubling is the failure of the project to discuss softwarespecific issues such as preemption and license/sale. We do not know
why the Principles does not address those issues, but we suspect that it
is because agreement could not be reached on how to resolve them.
56. This patch might have resembled the “hub-and-spoke” method originally
contemplated for revising Article 2 of the UCC. See William H. Henning, Amended Article
2: What Went Wrong?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 131, 134 (2009).
57. The Principles did not neglect UCITA. It is constantly cited throughout the
document, and often during the meetings of the Members’ Consultative Group old battles
over UCITA were fought once again. One of us did not participate in the UCITA wars and
was amazed by the frequency and intensity with which those battles were refought.
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These issues are very important indeed, and we suspect that pressure
for any particular solution was evenly balanced. Neither the Reporters
nor the courts have been able to see their way to a definitive
resolution. Perhaps it would have been wise for the Reporters to tell
us such was the case; that certainly would be useful information for all
lawmakers to have. In any event, the issues should have been
discussed, even if they could not be resolved.
C.

Keep to Your Charter

Another serious concern comes from the Reporters’ constant
tinkering with well-settled law that has nothing to do with software.
We have mentioned such items as a different version of the battle of
the forms, and provisions dealing with choice of law and choice of
forum.58 Although the solutions to generic problems proffered by the
Principles seem reasonable enough, there is grave danger in their
being addressed by a project explicitly designed to address a specific
issue. Regardless of their merit, these changes now bear the
imprimatur of the ALI. That is a pretty powerful brand name, and it is
possible that the provisions on choice of law or forum may, as a result,
have some influence in the world. That would be unfortunate, for the
provisions were drafted and approved without active consideration of
those who are experts in choice-of-law—conflict-of-laws scholars.59
Similarly, the generic contracts changes were made without
consideration by the larger world of contracts scholars and lawyers.60
Facially, the Principles Project seems to be a “niche” project of interest
to those with a specific interest in software and intellectual property.
But it is a project with much wider substantive scope in that software
transactions implicate broader issues of property, contract, and choice
of law. Despite this broader scope, there were not many people
actively involved in the project—no more than a couple of dozen
attended the meetings of the Consultative Group, and the ALI session
at which the Final Draft was approved was poorly attended. This is far
too small a portion of the membership of the ALI to consider
provisions that extend beyond the niche of software-specific contract
problems.

58. See supra text accompanying notes 29-35.
59. One of us teaches and writes about conflicts. There were not many other
conflicts experts among the Advisors or Consultative Group, and conflicts experts who were
not part of the project seemed blissfully unaware of it.
60. We do not believe that it is sufficient for those experts to know of the possibility
that there might be portions of a project dealing with, say, choice of law.
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We do not know, of course, what the response of those worlds to
the changes would have been. But we believe that that the ALI should
be careful in approving generic provisions in specific projects without
explicit consideration of those changes by those who are more familiar
with the area. That caution is especially appropriate when the project
changes black-letter sections of a Restatement. The ALI should be
aware of “mission creep.”
These lessons should give some pause for the future of the ALI’s
Principles projects. Their history has not been a happy one. The
Principles of Corporate Governance drew forceful criticism from the
project’s inception.61 More recently, the Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution has also drawn serious criticism based on its
scope.62 Earlier, the Complex Litigation Project,63 the result of much
effort by many persons, languishes virtually uncited and unnoticed by
the courts. Perhaps any attempt to capture “Best Principles” rather
than to restate existing law in a project necessarily bound to take
several years to complete is doomed to failure. The Restatements have
been phenomenally successful, perhaps because they address subjects
that were already well developed in the common law.64 The American
Law Institute should ponder the future of its Principles projects.

61. See generally Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The American Law
Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325 (1987).
62. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: The
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV.
923, 924 (2001) (describing that project as “the latest embodiment of a recurring tension in
the ALI between its aim to harmonize the diversity of extant laws and an equal focus on the
better adaptation [of the law] to social needs” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI’s Treatment of De Facto Parents,
in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 90 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
63. Although written before the Principles projects were conceived, Complex
Litigation has much in common with them.
64. There has long been a robust debate as to whether the goal of Restatements
should be descriptive or normative. See generally Kristen David Adams, Blaming the
Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205 (2007); Kristen David
Adams, The Folly of Uniformity?: Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 423 (2004). The Business Roundtable noted the authoritative stature of Restatements in
its criticism of the ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance, which started as a Restatement
project. See Seligman, supra note 61, at 351 (“[Restatements] are frequently cited as primary
‘precedent,’ before cases . . . .”).

